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Abstract
Within the last decade, the use of wireless technologies has become more prevalent. Wireless networks have
flexible architectures with data transferred via radio waves and can be divided into two categories;
infrastructure-based wireless networks and mobile ad hoc network.
The mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is an autonomous system which can be dynamically built without preexisting infrastructure or a trusted third party (TTP). Due to these infrastructure-less and self-organized
characteristics, MANET encounters different problems from infrastructure-based wired network, such as key
management, power shortage, and security issues. This paper will further divide MANETs into pure ad hoc
networks which do not contain a TTP and organized ad hoc networks which contain an offline TTP, and then
focus on the security issues especially the non-repudiation issue between two mobile nodes which communicate
in pure ad hoc networks.
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INTRODUCTION

In this paper, wireless networks can be divided into two categories; infrastructure-based wireless networks (see
Figure 1.a) and mobile ad hoc network (see Figure 1.b). Furthermore, MANETs can be classified into pure ad hoc
networks which do not contain a TTP (see Figure 2.a) and organized ad hoc networks which contain an offline TTP
(see Figure 2.b).
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Figure 1:XArchitecture of Wireless Networks
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Figure 2: Architecture of Ad Hoc Networks
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The mobility of nodes in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) is both its unique and defining feature, but
invalidates many Xapproaches to security that exist in other forms of network (Zhou and Haas 1999; Karpijoki
2001; Papadimitratos and Haas 2003; Hu and Sharma 2005). With no pre-existing infrastructure
there is no
X
central authority, such as PKI architecture, to manage public keys in MANETs.
MANETs
traditionally
are unable
X
to authenticate key exchange with publich keys, and hence are unable to guarantee confidentiality and security.
X
Recent research has developed self-organized public key systems for
X use in ad hoc networks (Capkun, Buttyan et
al. 2003; Li, Gordon et al. 2004).
X These methods are helpful for nodes to manage public keys without an existing
X
central authority. Once nodes receive public keys, they are able to maintain some degree of security.
X have been applied in emergency Xmedical and military systems
X
MANETs
and have potential uses
X in several other
fields. Many Xcurrent live situations where MANETS are used, such as in search-and-rescue operations, require
the transfer of mission-critical information in real time. Furthermore, applications where MANETs may have
potential uses but have no implementation, such as M-Commerce, are not progressing as security in online
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node’s participation, may provide secure communication over an insecure medium, and can be made nondependent on involved infrastructure. The intention of this paper is to develop a method designed to create an
environment that enforces non-repudiation in pure ad hoc networks to ensure the fairness of online transactions
and within the transfer of data between nodes. This protocol will be based on work by several other researchers,

but will attempt to identify and incorporate the strengths of each, whilst identifying and mitigating any
weaknesses that may be presented.
A non-repudiation protocol is comprised of two main components; non-repudiation of origin (NRO) evidence
and non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) evidence (Zhou and Gollman 1996a; Zhou and Gollman 1996b; Zhou and
Gollman 1997b). An NRO is signed by the originator with its secret key and can be viewed as evidence by the
recipient, and a NRR is signed by the recipient with its secret key and can be viewed as evidence by the
originator. Originators and recipients will be unable to take advantage of others when they obtain an NRR or
NRO using a non-repudiation protocol which also can prevent malicious nodes from falsely denying previous
actions.
To achieve non-repudiation between two nodes, a TTP is usually involved in situations when an injustice occurs. A
TTP is a reasonable solution to solve disputes between two nodes in a wired network, but a TTP can not perfectly
operate within a MANET environment, whose defining characteristic is no pre-existing infrastructure or trusted
central authorities. Therefore, non-repudiation protocols which require the involvement of a TTP to solve the
dispute are not suitable for use in MANET settings. Thus, a special non-repudiation protocol which can perfectly
work without the involvement of a TTP (Markowitch and Roggeman 1999) must be adopted to achieve the fairness
between two mobile nodes.

CURRENT RESEARCH
Published protocols from other researchers can be classified into two main categories: non-repudiation protocols
which focus on specific areas, such as efficiency and the development of new protocols; ad hoc networks
including areas such as security issues and routing subjects.
The research for these two aims is being developed independently, and there are few researchers that aim to
merge these disparate requirements (Wang and Guo 2004).
Achieving fairness within wireless networks
The fair is defined as “at the end of the protocol, either an originator receives NRR evidence and a recipient
receives the message and NRO evidence” (Kremer, Markowitch et al. 2002). Therefore, the fairness is an
essential requirement of a transaction in any type of network. Keeping the fairness of the protocol is helpful for
participants to complete procedures. No participant is willing to join in an unfair transaction neither in the real
world nor in the electronic world.
A fair exchange protocol for use in a wireless network was developed by Wang and Guo (Wang and Guo 2004).
This protocol establishes a pseudo-resilient channel which uses a cyclic resending method to ensure a message
sent will arrive at the intended recipient or recipients. The protocol developed also uses a non-interactive
verifying approach, an RSA-based convertible signature scheme, and a transparent TTP to reduce
communication and computation consumptions. Although this protocol uses several computation saving policies,
a transparent TTP is still required to solve any disagreement which may occur.
Four different sub-protocols discussed in this paper are:
Registration protocol: ensures Alice and Bob both have to register with the TTP to acquire certificates before
performing this protocol.
Main protocol can guarantee that Alice and Bob will obtain non-repudiation evidence.
Recovery protocol is performed by Alice or Bob to obtain final non-repudiation evidence from the TTP when an
error occurs.
Abort protocol can only be activated by Alice to abort the transaction.
On Demand Public Key Management for Wireless Ad Hoc Network
The private and public key pair is a prerequisite of any type of network including wireless ad hoc networks.
Obtaining certificate public keys from other nodes in the same MANET is important for security issues, such as
confidentiality issues, integrity issues and non-repudiation issues.
On demand public key management based on hop differences between nodes was proposed by Li, Gordon and
Slay in (Li, Gordon et al. 2004). The protocol includes key generation, distribution, verification, and revocation
within a pure ad hoc network. In this schema, the topology is defined by the proximity of nodes as:
1.

1-hop neighbors are within each other’s transmission range

2-hop neighbors are beyond one hop distance but have at least one common 1-hop neighbour.

multi-hop nodes are more than two hops away from each other
Intermediate nodes are encouraged to participate in certificating procedures to update information about other
nodes’ public keys. The more procedures nodes are involved in, the more updated information they will obtain.
The main contribution of this paper is that nodes will not only have the public keys of other nodes, but these will
have been certified and recognized as genuine.
Probabilistic Non-Repudiation without Trust Third Party
Most of non-repudiation protocols are based on an adjudicator to estimate the validity of NRO and NRR
evidence, and judge injustices between participants. The probabilistic non-repudiation protocol however does not
need the involvement of a TTP to keep the fairness. This feature corresponds with the nature of pure ad hoc
networks.
A novel fair protocol which can perform without a TTP was proposed by Markowitch and Roggeman
(Markowitch and Roggeman 1999) to achieve non-repudiation between a client and a salesman in the electronic
world.
The transaction processes are:
Client  Provider: Request for a service
Provider  Client: Service
Client  Provider: Payment (acknowledgement)
This is a great improvement for non-repudiation protocols which always rely on the involvement of a TTP
(Coffey and Saidha 1996; Zhou and Gollman 1996a; Zhou and Gollman 1996b; Asokan, Schunter et al. 1997;
Zhou and Gollmann 1997a; Zhou and Gollman 1997b). The fairness of this protocol is based on the random
number n chosen by the originator of the transaction. Because the recipient of the transaction cannot obtain this
number, this particular non-repudiation protocol is applicable for most situations.
The procedures are described in the following steps.
The recipient (Bob) determines the date D
Step 1. B  A sSKB(request,B,A,D)
The originator (Alice): checks D
chooses n
computes the signed f1, : : :, fn
Step 2. A  B sSKA (fn(m),A,B,D)
Step 3. B  A sSKB(ack1)
Step 4. A  B sSKA (fn-1(m),A,B,D)
Step 5. B  A sSKB(ack2)
.
.
Step 2n -2. A  B sSKA (f2(m),A,B,D)
Step 2n-1. B  A sSKB(ackn-1)
Step 2n. A  B sSKA(f1(m),A,B,D)
Step 2n+1. B  A sSKB(ackn)
m= fn(m) fn-1(m) … f1(m).

NRO={NROi | i=1,…,n}, with NROi= sSKA (fi(m),A,B,D)
NRR=sSKB(ackn)

A Fair Non-Repudiation Protocol
NRO and NRR evidence are basic components for participants to verify the transaction. Furthermore, NRD and
NRS evidence are proof of a transaction between nodes and a TTP. This evidence is essential components for
non-repudiation protocols.
Zhou and Gollmann stated that “A fair non-repudiation protocol should not give the sender of a message an
advantage over the receiver, or vice versa” (Zhou and Gollman 1996a). Researchers developed a non-repudiation
protocol which needs the use of a TTP to judge a transaction and to keep the fairness between a sender and a
receiver.
Four different types of evidence are proposed in this paper:
Non-repudiation of origin (NRO) is intended to protect against the originator’s false denial of having sent the
message.
Non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) is intended to protect against a recipient’s false denial of having received the
message.
Non-repudiation of delivery (NRD) is facilitated by evidence that the message was forwarded by the TTP.
Non-repudiation of submission (NRS) is intended to protect against the originator’s false denial of having
submitted the message to the TTP.
At the end of the protocol, the sender obtains NRR evidence and the receiver obtains NRO evidence. NRD and
NRS are the evidences which are created after the sender or receiver communicating with the TTP. These
evidences are basic components for nodes to verify the transaction. NRO and NRR evidence is also used in the
proposed method.

NON-REPUDIATION IN MOBILE PURE AD HOC NETWORKS
Notation
TTP: Trusted Third Party
SKP: Secret Key of Principal P
PKP: Public Key of Principal P
m: message
X  Y:m: Principal X sends message m to Principal Y
t: timestamp
ePKP (m): encrypt message m with Principal P’s public key
sSKP (m): message m is signed by Principal P’s secret key
Non-repudiation of Origin (NRO): NRO is a type of evidence for the recipient to protect against the
originator’s false denial of having sent the message.
Non-repudiation of Receipt (NRR): NRR is a type of evidence for the originator to protect against the
recipient’s false denial of having received the message.
Proposed Methodology
In the protocol discussed in (Li, Gordon et al. 2004), every node creates its own public key and secret key pair
without any communication with a TTP. In this paper, the size of these keys is not restricted, and several key
sizes may be used by different nodes concurrently. For example, Alice makes her own public and secret key pair
in 512 bit and Bob makes his own public and secret key pair in 1024 bit. As long as they exchange their public
keys with each other correctly, Alice can get Bob’s 1024 bit public key, and Bob will get Alice’s 512 bit public
key. Alice then can sign the message by her 512 bit secret key, and Bob can use her 512 bit public key to verify
the message. Alternatively, Bob can sign his message with his key, and this can be verified by Alice. The only
disadvantage of using several key sizes is that all encryption is conducted at the lowest key size, negating the
benefit of having a large key pair. However, the length of keys is not restricted for any reason. A node can decide
the length of his or her own public and secret key pair in an ad hoc network.
After the procedures of the method proposed in (Li, Gordon et al. 2004), every node in the same ad hoc network
will acquire the certificates of other nodes’ public key. Nodes are encouraged to become intermediaries in
certificate procedures, because the more procedures they involved in, the more information (public key

certificates) they can obtain. Alice is assumed to be the originator and Bob is assumed to be the recipient in this
chapter.
Once a node obtains the public keys of other nodes, the probabilistic non-repudiation protocol (Markowitch and
Roggeman 1999) is then appropriate for a pure ad hoc network to maintain fairness in transactions. An extra
timestamp is applied to this protocol, and the usage of the timestamp is slightly modified to decrease the
computational time. For example, Alice will only send timestamp t1 during the transaction process instead of
sending subsequent transactions (such as t3 or t5) as NRO evidence is combined with sSKA (f1(m),A,B,D) sSKA
(f2(m),A,B,D) … sSKA (fn(m),A,B,D,t1). Therefore, Alice only needs one timestamp (t1) in step 2 (as discussed
below) to prove the time when the NRO evidence is created. On the other hand, Bob only sends timestamp t2 with
ack1 to Alice in step 3 (as discussed below), rather than sending timestamps in all subsequent messages as NRR
evidence is combined with ack1 ack2 … ackn. Therefore, Bob only needs one timestamp (t2) in step 3 (as
discussed below) to prove the time when the NRO evidence is created. The timestamp refers to when the node
signs the message. A timestamp can prevent not only replay attacks from other malicious nodes, but also NRO
and NRR evidence from reuse.
The procedural details are as follows:
Step 1: B  A: sSKB(request,B,A,D)
Bob uses his secret key SKB to sign the requested data D. This creates sSKB(request,B,A,D) and is sent to
Alice. When Alice receives sSKB(request,B,A,D), she will validate data D, chooses a random number n,
and divides function f into n sub-functions, f1 f2 … fn-1 fn.
Step 2: A  B: sSKA(fn(m),A,B,D,t1)
Alice first calculates message m by using sub-function fn() to obtain fn(m). Alice then uses her secret
SKA to sign fn(m), data D and timestamp t1, giving sSKA(fn(m),A,B,D,t1), which is then sent to Bob.
Step 3: B  A: sSKB(ack1,t2)
Bob receives sSKA(fn(m),A,B,D,t1) from Alice, and verifies it by Alice’s public key. He then uses his
secret key SKB to sign ack1 and timestamp t2, giving sSKB(ack1,t2), which is then sent to Alice to be
viewed as evidence for sSKA(fn(m),A,B,D,t1).
Step 4: A  B: sSKA(fn-1(m),A,B,D)
Alice first calculates message m by using sub-function fn-1() to obtain fn-1(m). Alice then uses her secret
SKA to sign fn-1(m), and data D, giving sSKA(fn-1(m),A,B,D), which is then sent to Bob.
Step 5: B  A: sSKB(ack2)

.
.
.

Bob receives sSKA(fn-1(m),A,B,D) from Alice, and verifies it by Alice’s public key. He then uses his secret
key SKB to sign ack2, giving sSKB(ack2), which is then sent to Alice to be viewed as evidence for sSKA(fn-1
(m),A,B,D).

Step 2n-2: A  B: sSKA(f2(m),A,B,D)
Alice first calculates message m by using sub-function f2() to obtain f2(m). Alice then uses her secret SKA
to sign f2(m) and data D, giving sSKA(f2(m),A,B,D), which is then sent to Bob.
Step 2n-1: B  A: sSKB(ackn-1)
Bob receives sSKA(f2(m),A,B,D) from Alice, and verifies it by Alice’s public key. He then uses his secret
key SKB to sign ackn-1, giving sSKB(ackn-1), which is then sent to Alice to be viewed as evidence for sSKA
(f2(m),A,B,D).
Step 2n: A  B: sSKA(f1(m),A,B,D)
Alice first calculates message m using sub-function f1() to get f1(m). Alice then uses her secret SKA to sign
f1(m), and data D, giving sSKA(f1(m),A,B,D), which is then sent to Bob.
Step 2n+1: B  A: sSKB(ackn)

Bob receives sSKA(f1(m),A,B,D) from Alice, and verifies it by Alice’s public key. He then uses his secret
key SKB to sign ackn, giving sSKB(ackn), which is then sent to Alice to be viewed as evidence for sSKA(f1
(m),A,B,D).
Message m= fn(m) fn-1(m) … f1(m)
NRO={NROi+NROn | i=1,…,n-1}, with NROi= sSKA (fi(m),A,B,D), and NROn=sSKA(fn(m),A,B,D,t1)
NRR={NRR1+NRRi | i=2,…,n}, with NRRi = sSKB(acki) and acki=(i,B,A,D); NRR1=sSKB(ack1,t2) and ack1=
(1,B,A,D)
At the end of this protocol, Bob (recipient) will obtain message m and NRO evidence, and Alice (originator) will
obtain NRR evidence.

DISSCUSSION
The protocol proposed is similar to that discussed by Wang and Guo (Wang and Guo 2004), but offers distinct
advantages within a MANET environment. Unlike Wang and Guo’s implementation, this protocol does not rely
upon use of a TTP to ensure fairness within a transaction between two nodes. This makes the proposed protocol
applicable for use in pure ad hoc networking environments.
The protocol proposed in this paper places emphasis on what nodes can do after receiving the certificated public
and secret key pair, and is inspired by traditional non-repudiation protocols (Coffey and Saidha 1996; Zhou and
Gollman 1996a; Meng, Wang et al. 2002; Ray and Ray 2002)to consider the issues associated with nonrepudiation within pure ad hoc networks. Although a TTP is a practical solution to solve a dispute between two
nodes, fixed infrastructure is not applicable in a pure ad hoc network topology. Some existing non-repudiation
protocols (Zhou and Gollman 1996b; Zhou and Gollman 1997b) also require Non-Repudiation of Delivery
(NRD) evidence and Non-Repudiation of Submission (NRS) evidence to prove the communication actually
occurred between nodes and a TTP, in addition to the NRR and NRO evidence required by other non-repudiation
protocols (Zhou and Gollman 1996a; Zhou and Gollmann 1997a). The major difference between the proposed
non-repudiation method and the method developed by Li, Gordon and Slay in (Li, Gordon et al. 2004) is the
proposed solution focuses on the non-repudiation of the communication rather than the issues associated with
key management. This protocol assumes that key management has occurred, and hence may rely upon systems
discussed by other authors.
The proposed method does not encounter the same issues as traditional non-repudiation protocols (Coffey and
Saidha 1996; Zhou and Gollman 1996a; Zhou and Gollman 1996b; Asokan, Schunter et al. 1997; Zhou and
Gollmann 1997a; Zhou and Gollman 1997b) including area such as computational complexity with a TTP, as it is
particularly designed for use within pure ad hoc networks, unlike other methodologies, which are adapted to pure
ad hoc use after being primarily designed for infrastructure-based networks.
The use of NRD and NRS evidence is avoided in the design of the proposed solution, as the use of these in
addition to NRR and NRO evidence increases the computational complexity of the protocol, and the use of
lightweight protocols is favored in MANET development. In this situation, nodes will have non-repudiation
insurance whilst retaining the benefits of a pure ad hoc network.
The key of the proposed method is that the originator secretly chooses a random number n before sending data,
and the recipient does not know this random number. The originator and the recipient are unable to take any
advantage of each other given this assumption. The originator hopes the data will be sent completely, and that the
transaction is not interrupted. Similarly, the recipient wishes the protocol finished without interruption as the
transaction must complete for the information to be deciphered. Therefore, neither the originator nor the recipient
will terminate the transaction arbitrarily. The only way for the recipient to obtain data without sending an NRR is
to guess the random number n. If the recipient is able to determine the random number n, he or she can terminate
the procedure at step 2n ( as the recipient can decipher message m by combining the received data f1, f2,… , fn-1,
fn), without activating step 2n+1 (therefore originator will not get ackn, he can not get NRR by combining ack1,
ack2,…, ackn-2, ackn-1). The final result in this situation is that the recipient receives the message m, but the
originator does not receive the NRR evidence. This breaches the fairness between the originator and the
recipient. However, this protocol relies on the fact that the recipient does not know when the last step (random
number n) occurs.
Due to this reliance on keeping the random number unknown to the recipient, this protocol still has a chance of
failure, and hence is more suited to low value transactions than high value ones. Despite this reliance, this
method represents a reasonable solution to solve the dispute in a pure ad hoc network with particular
characteristics.

CONCLUSION
The intention of this paper is to focus on the non-repudiation between originators and recipients within pure
MANETs. Communications and transactions in MANETs are not completely reliable for nodes due to the nature
of the networks. The application of the probabilistic non-repudiation protocol, adapted to perform without a TTP,
allows nodes not only to communicate safely with each other in MANETs, but also for non-repudiation evidence
after data exchange.
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